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 1 
THE SEVENTY-FIRST CLEVELAND-MARSHALL FUND  
VISITING SCHOLAR LECTURE 
THE RIGHT TO KILL IN COLD BLOOD:  DOES THE DEATH 
PENALTY VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS? 
ALAN RYAN1 
This essay began life as a public lecture, and I have not tried to remove the 
informality of style appropriate to such an occasion.  The essence of the argument is 
this: all punishment must be inflicted in cold blood; whatever damage we do to 
others not in cold blood is not punishment but self-defense or revenge; what we have 
a right to inflict in cold blood is a question of the rules of just social cooperation and 
especially the justice of the sanctions required to sustain those rules; it is here argued 
that the fundamental principle is that we may inflict whatever punishment is 
necessary to deter wrongdoing and not disproportionate to the offence; I do not 
dismiss ‘pure’ retribution as a goal of punishment, but I do not discuss it here.  I 
invoke only a diluted concept of retribution in the form of the concept of a 
‘proportionate’ response to crime.  The central issue of fairness is then that of the 
process by which alleged criminals are pursued and caught, questioned, tried, and 
sentenced; on the view taken here, the death penalty raises no questions of justice 
that are different in kind from those raised by other forms of punishment, but that 
death as contrasted with incarceration may be thought to raise questions about 
irreversibility that are different in degree.  One reason for insisting that a failure of 
fairness in the criminal justice system makes all punishment suspect is that an undue 
attention to the death penalty (by both defenders and opponents) diverts attention 
from too many of the other injustices perpetrated in our name.  Finally, the essay 
turns to the question of how we should discuss the penalty of death in particular, and 
I invoke the shade of Joseph de Maistre for the purpose. 
I hope that you will be unable to detect whether I am an enthusiast for the death 
penalty, an opponent of capital punishment, or deeply ambivalent.  You may have 
your suspicions about where my allegiances lie, but I shall do my best to leave you 
uncertain whether your suspicions are well-founded.  I ought perhaps to mention that 
one of my philosophical heroes, John Stuart Mill, not only believed in the 
indispensability of the death penalty as a deterrent, but personally launched a private 
prosecution for murder against a brutal British Governor of Jamaica, with every 
intention of having Governor Eyre hanged.2  What you should have no doubt about is 
my answer to the question I pose in my subtitle.  My answer is that whatever 
objections one might have to the death penalty, they should not be objections to its 
compatibility in principle with any plausible account of human rights.  If anyone 
wants  to know only my answer to the question whether the death penalty must 
always and in principle violate human rights, they have it―it is NO.  But I doubt 
                                                                
1Warden, New College, Oxford University. 
2The story is told in MICHAEL ST JOHN PACKE, THE LIFE OF JOHN STUART MILL, 463-72 
(1956). 
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whether anyone does want to know only that.  The 65 (today) to 85 percent (in the 
1980s) of the American people who say in response to questionnaires that they 
believe in the death penalty already believe that it does not violate  human rights, and 
don’t need me to reassure them.  Nor will the twenty percent or so who think that it 
is intrinsically barbarous, morally disgusting, and that it will inevitably be 
administered in a racially and economically biased fashion, much care whether some 
version of the death penalty might be operated without violating anyone’s rights.  
The very small percentage of the American people who share my professional 
interest in the history of arguments about human rights know without my telling 
them  that lawyers, philosophers, and legislators over the centuries have argued not 
only that our rights do not include the right not to be subjected to the death penalty 
under appropriate conditions, even―as did Immanuel Kant, GWF Hegel, and some 
of their late 19th Century disciples in Britain and the USA - that criminals have a 
positive right to be executed. 
So why do I chase this particular hare again?  Partly because of the contrast 
between the  light-heartedness of Governor George Bush over  the likelihood that the 
death penalty has been carried out on Texans who were not guilty of the crime for 
which they were executed, and the anxieties of Governor Ryan of Illinois, who 
declared a moratorium on executions as soon as he became unsure that everyone on 
death row was properly there.3  Partly because it is a very striking fact that the 
United States is a country that takes rights seriously; and yet the USA refuses to 
subscribe to various international declarations of human rights because they state that 
the death penalty violates those rights.  Partly because of something  I do not myself 
fully understand.  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was 
first ratified in 1950  by a number of European states including Great Britain was 
modified in 1983 to include a protocol (the Sixth Protocol,) prohibiting the use of the 
death penalty except in time of war by any of the states that were signatories to the 
Convention.  This would have been impossible at the date of its first creation.  Not 
only Britain, but France, the Benelux countries, and most others not only had capital 
punishment on the statute books but actually carried out executions.  The French, 
indeed, only abolished executions by means of the guillotine in 1981, having carried 
out the last execution in 1977.  The British slowly relinquished the use of hanging, 
but after a near-miss at abolition in 1947, further attempts to abolish the death 
penalty in the 1950s came to nothing, and a Royal Commission reporting in 1953 
declared itself uncertain on the facts, but inclined to think that death was a ‘unique 
deterrent.’  The discussion in those years never suggested that even if it was a unique 
deterrent, it violated the human rights of the executed prisoner.  Lawyers assumed an 
existing consensus on the limits of lawful punishment; lawful punishment, inflicted 
only after a fair trial and a sound verdict, might be ineffective, might have bad 
consequences of one sort and another, but was not itself a violation of the rights of 
                                                                
3Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Flawed Trials Lead to Death Chamber:  Bush Confident 
in System Rife with Problems, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2000, at C1; Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, 
Gatekeeper Court Keeps Gates Shut Justices Prove Reluctant to Nullify Cases, CHI. TRIB, June 
12, 2000, at N1 (on Governor Bush); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death 
Penalty Illinois First State to Impose Moratorium on Executions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, at 
C1 (on Governor Ryan); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan:  ‘Until I Can Be Sure’ Illinois 
is First State to Suspend Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB. Feb. 1, 2000, at N1 (on Governor Ryan).   
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the condemned.  It was assumed that the processes of the law were sufficiently  
respectful of the rights of the accused and of the condemned. 
I do not know why sentiment against the death penalty moved so swiftly and 
completely in Europe, moved rather reluctantly and incompletely in Britain, and 
swung dramatically back and forth in the United States.  In the United States, 
opinion was firmly in favor of the death penalty in the 1950s, swung against it to the 
extent that supporters were in a minority in the 1960s, then swung back again until at 
present it is supported by 64 percent of those polled, after attaining a high point of 
support at 84 percent.4  One needs to begin with a well-known, but under-appreciated 
paradox.  In no country where capital punishment has been abolished has it been 
abolished with the support of the electorate.  To put it the other way round, in no 
country has the electorate demanded the abolition of capital punishment, and seen 
legislators follow public opinion by abolishing it.  There are many countries in which 
capital punishment no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the population; in 
all countries, the number who support it varies quite dramatically according to 
whether the most recent event in the public mind is the murder of a small child by a 
sexually deranged adult or the execution of a probably innocent person.  But in no 
Western society has the death penalty been abolished because the public at large 
demanded its abolition.5  The common pattern is that it is abolished because 
legislators decide that it is either not a deterrent or that too many doubtful 
convictions have occurred, or that it is for whatever reason distasteful, and the 
electorate then gets used to it not existing; as that happens, so legislators get used to 
not trying to restore it, and the public eventually goes off the whole idea.  But 
principled opposition to capital punishment is not a common trait in democratic 
electorates.   Nor is principled support for it important in Europe.   That punishment 
ought to reflect some version of  ‘an eye for an eye’ is felt by many people, but it is 
not argued for by pressure groups or politicians.  This contrasts with other issues that 
attract similar degrees of passion when they flare up in the public mind.  In Britain, 
there is a persistent, if low-key campaign by right-to-life groups to have the rules on 
abortion tightened up, and to have the 1967 Act regulating abortion either repealed 
or made much more restrictive.  Similarly, pro-gay groups persistently campaigned 
for many years to have the age of consent made the same for homosexual and 
heterosexual relations―it has just become sixteen in all cases - and MPs introduced 
legislation to this effect from time to time.  Nothing of the sort happens with respect 
to the death penalty.  Two rather half-hearted attempts at reinstatement shortly after 
repeal are all there have been.  Large numbers of the public insist when sufficiently 
excited and goaded on by interviewers from the tabloid press that sex offenders 
should be hanged―preferably after prolonged torture culminating in castration; but 
there is no steady, persistent pressure on the legislature to reintroduce even the 
sanitized executions by lethal injection that American states have instituted.6 
                                                                
4See Harris Report, July 11-17, 2000 (reporting on a 64 percent support today against a 
low of 38 percent in 1964 and a high in Harris polls of 75 percent in 1995). 
5See HAWKINS & ZIMRING, THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA (1986). 
6The anti-pedophile riots at Portsdown housing complex in the summer of 2000 suggest 
the passions that can be unleashed when the public sees its children potentially at risk, but no 
sustained pressure for the reinstatement of capital punishment has resulted from such 
outbreaks. 
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This returns me to the oddity of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Although Canada and some other not-very-European countries have observer status 
at the Council of Europe, the USA could not do so, because the retention of the death 
penalty is inconsistent with membership.  (Actually, that is not strictly true; as 
always with treaties that commit states to acknowledging the provisions of a 
convention, there is room for derogation and reservation.  Britain for some years 
preserved as a matter of law, though not of practice, the death penalty for those rare 
persons who committed piracy with violence on the high seas or treason, a crime that 
included the seduction of the sovereign’s daughter as well as betraying one’s country 
to an enemy in time of war.  Even in its present apparently absolute form, the 
Convention allows states to use the death penalty in time of war, a concession not 
allowed for the use of torture, which is banned absolutely.)  The Sixth Protocol 
proposed in 1983 does not go into details about the change of heart on the death 
penalty, but simply notes that in the thirty years since the Convention was initially 
promulgated, European opinion had turned against the death penalty and most 
European countries had given up its use.7  This does not amount to saying that at 
some time during that thirty years they had noticed, discovered, or decided that the 
death penalty was a violation of human rights.  Nor in fact is the chronology of the 
death penalty’s falling into desuetude quite as neat as that suggests.  There was a 
considerable gap in many countries between their ceasing to execute anyone in 
practice and their abandoning the penalty in theory; the Swedes last executed anyone 
in 1910, but abolished the penalty only in the 1950s, while Eire took from 1954 to 
1990 to bring abstentionist theory into line with abstentionist practice.  Britain last 
executed anyone in 1964 - the victim on that occasion, a man called Joseph Hanratty,  
may well have been innocent, but even if not, there had always been enough anxiety 
about the matter to make it an appropriate case to pause on―and the penalty was 
abolished for everything save piracy and treason in 1973; only in 1998 when Britain 
prepared to incorporate the Convention into British law did Parliament take the last 
step and abolish it entirely.  Nobody noticed, and there was no evidence that either 
the Royal Family or our mariners slept less easily in their beds and hammocks.  Part 
of what lay behind the movement in Europe was a change of heart within the 
Catholic church; traditionally, the Church had had no qualms over the death penalty, 
but for the past thirty years or so, whether the Pope has been a liberal like John XXII 
or a conservative like the present Pope, the Church has been opposed to execution, 
and has exposed itself to numerous rebuffs from American states by appealing, and 
usually in vain, for reprieves for convicted criminals on the verge of execution.   
Now, it is, of course, true that if we define human rights in positivist terms - that 
is to say, as those rights that are protected by some applicable convention or other 
and accepted by the government within whose jurisdiction the question arises - then 
it is true of all citizens of those states that are signatories to the ECHR and members 
of the Council of Europe, that the imposition of the death penalty on them and there 
would violate their human rights.  And conversely, for citizens of the United States 
in the United States, it would not.  The situation of European nationals in American 
courts would be conceptually problematic on this view, though in law their position 
is covered by the Vienna Convention.  Failures of individual states to take any notice 
                                                                
7And true to form the British government at first, proposed not to adopt the Sixth Protocol, 
because it wishes to be able to reinstate the death penalty―should there be reason to do 
so―without the need to denounce the entire Convention. 
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of the convention have recently placed the US government in some difficulty on the 
matter.  But a positive account of human rights is highly implausible.  The thought 
that the human rights of Europeans are different from the human rights of Americans 
empties the concept of human rights of all meaning.  The point of talking about 
human rights is to claim that what lies behind the positive rights set out in a 
convention are deep rights, rights that ground the convention rights rather than 
simply flowing from them or reflecting them.  Human rights are what we used to call 
“natural rights” or “moral rights” or just “rights.”  
What I claim is that the infliction of death is not a violation of the human rights 
of a convicted felon under appropriate conditions, and in the converse that 
individuals and society as a whole have the right to inflict such a sentence, but I am 
also going to argue that this has moral force as a defense of the death penalty only if 
many other rights are in place.  There are many rights of the accused and convicted 
that have to be respected, and many conditions that must be in place before we may 
justly exercise our right to kill in cold blood.  I go this long way round for something 
other than the pleasure of performing philosophical arabesques.  In the summer of 
2000, an essayist in The New Republic, engaging in the journal’s favorite pastime of 
irritating such liberals as still read it, argued that the rise of DNA testing in capital 
cases might backfire on the liberals who had demanded it.  They, he observed, had 
demanded DNA testing on the assumption that it would show condemned felons to 
be innocent; but what if it showed that they were guilty?  Would that not open the 
way to their execution?8   To which the answer, of course, is that pro tanto it must.  
To remove one obstacle to execution is to remove one obstacle to execution.  Why 
liberalism should be thought to be inconsistent with elementary logical inference is 
not clear to me, nor why the New Republic thinks itself so clever in pointing out a 
tautology.  But the New Republic and I are at one on the logic.  The right not to be 
executed - nor to suffer any other penalty―for a crime one has not committed, is the 
most basic right that must be respected if we are to have the right to take a life in 
cold blood.  If guilt is established without doubt, and by just and transparent means, 
the most important obstacle to execution has been cleared away. 
Let us approach this conclusion from the opposite direction: the right to punish 
anyone for anything, a right that Robert Owen and most anarchists have denied that 
we possess, but which I shall defend.  The first step is to distinguish punishment and 
self-defense; the right to self-defense is the right to retaliate against immediate 
attack, and by extension to do whatever is needed to prevent an assailant from 
immediately attacking us.9  The (potential) victim of an attack may do whatever is 
necessary under the circumstances, and must use his or her best judgment as to what 
that is.  That best judgment is subject to scrutiny.  If you are kicked in the leg by a 
five year old child, you cannot shoot her dead and pass that off as your best 
judgment; you have committed murder.  If you are attacked by a madman with a 
knife, on the other hand, you will be excused the death of your would-be assassin on 
the grounds that there is no way of knowing quite what he may do, and there is no 
upper bound to what you may need to do to protect yourself.  There is no settled 
                                                                
8Indeed, thus far the majority of retests have saved the life of the convicted criminal, but a 
minority of retests have confirmed their guilt.  See Gregg Easterbrook, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
July 31, 2000. 
9A thought implicit in the ECHR’s second article. 
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doctrine about these limits, as attested by that lamentable case in Louisiana five or 
six years ago, where a householder shot dead a Japanese schoolchild who knocked at 
the door to ask for directions, and was acquitted of all wrong-doing by a local jury; 
John Locke, the theorist of mild and constitutional government, insisted that 
defending our property in the absence of government assistance licenses the use of 
deadly force.  Someone who set out to rob us might do us worse harm still, and any 
degree of self-defense is licit.  But, the right to inflict punishment is not identical 
with the right to self-defense.  Punishment is what we threaten ahead of time and 
inflict after the event, but it is not whatever damage we may happen to do to 
someone from whom we are defending ourselves.  We may properly describe the 
institution of punishment as part of society’s battery of means of defending itself, but 
that is a different matter.  The right of self-defense is not the same as the right to 
inflict punishment.  Punishing people is something we not merely do in cold blood, 
but something that we morally―and almost logically―must do in cold blood.  First, 
the inflicter of the penalty must be authorized to impose the penalty and see to its 
carrying out; courts are so authorized, lynch mobs aren’t.  Locke thought individuals 
were  so authorized in the state of nature; Hume thought Locke’s view made no 
sense.  But both saw the same difference between doing something that could qualify 
as punishing and doing what amounted simply to harming someone else.  Locke was 
eager to insist that governments could only acquire rights that individuals gave them.  
If governments had a right to punish, they must have got it from individuals who 
transferred it to them.  Hume thought the institution of punishment just grew in the 
same way as property rights and government generally.  Second, the recipient of the 
penalty must be guilty of an offence, and must have been found guilty by a reputable 
procedure.  The point of a system of punishment is not primarily to respect the rights 
of the criminal, but none of us can pursue our purposes while violating the rights of 
others, not even the rights of criminals, so when we purport to punish someone we 
must not violate their rights in the process.  Third, the purpose of punishment is to 
secure the rights of the non-criminal, and to requite a proper measure of justice on 
the wicked.  Reliable systems of punishment based on proper adjudication and 
sentencing are as good a way as anyone knows to reduce the insecurity and 
uncertainty of a world in which we are vulnerable to theft, assault, sexual assault, 
and fraud on the part of others, without creating new forms of insecurity as bad as or 
worse than those we prevent.  This is what Herbert Hart many years ago called the 
general justifying aim of punishment.10  If you follow Locke and say that individuals 
have a right to punish by the light of nature, what does this mean?  It means that they 
may threaten others with harm which they will inflict on them if they damage other 
people’s legitimate interests; but it must be noticed―what Locke agreed his readers 
might think very strange―that the persons threatening punishment are behaving as if 
they were so to speak little governments before any real government existed.  This is 
because of the fourth point, that punishment must be aimed at any breach of the law, 
no matter who is harmed.  We say, not that if someone hurts us we shall retaliate, 
but that if they hurt anyone, we shall punish them.  The implausibility of imagining 
that persons bereft of government will in fact consult John Locke before they act is 
obvious enough.  We don’t think that individuals will act on behalf of others as 
                                                                
10Herbert Lionel Adolphus  Hart, Prolegomena to a Theory of Punishment, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY; ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968). 
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energetically as on behalf of themselves, indeed, we think they will act too 
energetically on behalf of themselves and not at all on behalf of others―that what 
we call punishment will in fact be revenge when our own interests are at stake, and 
non-existent otherwise.   
Nonetheless this objection itself shows what punishment really is, and therefore 
what we have a right to impose on others, and it shows what accused and convicted 
people have a right to.  To dogmatise, all of us have both a right and a duty to make a 
system of punishment but not a system of simple revenge work as it should.  We owe 
this to other people, and we owe it to them as part of a cooperative and fair system of 
mutual help for the sake of security and prosperity.  Everyone has a right to benefit 
from this system unless they forfeit that right in whole or in part by some violation; 
and among their rights are some they cannot forfeit because other human beings can 
never have the right to treat them unjustly, cruelly, or wickedly.  What we have the 
right to inflict by way of punishment is now the crucial topic.  On the face of it, we 
can inflict whatever meets two requirements; the first that it is effective in deterring 
and adequate in retributing misconduct; the second that it does not violate rights that 
a criminal cannot forfeit or imply rights on the part of the punisher that nobody can 
have.  Innumerable governments have violated this second condition.  The Spanish 
government of the 17th century made it a capital offence to import books from 
foreign publishers; nobody had a right to impose such a sentence, and being so 
sentenced violated the criminal’s rights.  However fastidious the legal process by 
which one’s guilt was ascertained, the offence was not (morally speaking) an 
offence, and the penalty not proportionate. 
If we take these thoughts in sequence, we reach the following position.  Because 
the infliction of punishment is itself a bad thing to the extent that it is the causing of 
misery, the amount of punishment to be inflicted must be the minimum necessary to 
achieve the goals of deterrence and retribution.11  To retribute to someone more than 
is proper is itself a violation of justice and therefore of their rights; it is also to cause 
more misery than strictly necessary, though that is a utilitarian argument rather than 
an argument from rights, and sustains an argument from rights only once you add 
that it is unjust that anyone should suffer more than is absolutely necessary to 
achieve a defensible goal.  To threaten by way of punishment more than is necessary 
to secure compliance (or effect just retribution) is to declare yourself ready to violate 
the rights of anyone whom we punish in fact.  The question whether it is right to 
threaten to do what it would be wrong to do in fact was much debated during the 
1950s by Catholic critics of nuclear deterrence; many theorists of deterrence claimed 
that in order to keep the peace it was necessary to threaten to launch a nuclear war if 
the Soviet Union launched the first strike even if we knew that no good purpose 
would be served by retaliation, and doubted whether we would actually do it.  Much 
elegant deterrence theory rests on the thought that it is good to lead your opponent to 
believe that you are stark raving mad and might retaliate from atop a radioactive ash 
heap.  Many Catholics held that if it would be wicked to launch a retaliatory strike 
we had no right to threaten to do it.   
                                                                
11This, of course, is explicitly denied by the Supreme Court judgment in, Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), where it is argued that the Eighth Amendment requires 
that the amount of punishment must not be excessive, but not that it must be the minimum 
necessary.  Just how much is to be inflicted is a matter for the legislature.   
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There is an analogous situation vis a vis the death penalty in the following sense.  
If the death penalty is not much of a deterrent in the case of murder and armed 
robbery, it surely would be in the case of parking offences; and yet everyone is clear 
that to threaten death for overstaying one’s time on a meter would be wicked―even 
if we were perfectly sure, on the one hand that the deterrent would be so effective 
that nobody would ever overstay, and on the other that if they were to do so by some 
mischance, we would find some way of remitting the sentence.  It follows that if the 
death penalty is either out of proportion to the crimes for which it is inflicted, or that 
some much lesser threat would secure everything that a system of deterrence needs 
to secure, the death penalty would be illicit as a punishment for those crimes too.  In 
short, punishment is not just something threatened for the sake of deterrence, it must 
also be an apt response to the crime for which it is threatened.  The overstayed 
parker is guilty only of mildly inconveniencing the rest of the public, if so much, and 
a small pecuniary penalty is adequate.  We have, you might say, a right to threaten 
that much, and nobody can have a right not to be threatened with that much, but we 
all have a right not to face the threat of more than that.   
My own view is that some argument of this sort is cogent; perhaps more to the 
point in this context, it is felt by most people to be cogent.  It can be given some 
unusual philosophical tweakings, however.  Immanuel Kant, for instance, held that 
the right to punish was implicit in a hypothetical social contract - one that nobody 
had in fact signed, but which we could imagine everyone signing, and could imagine 
embodying the conditions of mutual obligation that lie at the basis of social 
cooperation.  This contract allows each of us to invoke the assistance of everyone 
else in preventing others from violating our rights so long as we do our part to secure 
their rights as well; the contract guarantees our freedom from assaults on our lives, 
persons, and property as long as we cooperate in securing the same freedom for 
others.  Since this vision of the role of the state implies an essentially defensive role 
for it, there is no suggestion that the state’s task is to make us better, more amenable, 
more morally virtuous, or adherents of the true faith; all of those things are tasks for 
individuals working under the protection of the state, but not under its instructions.  
The role of punishment in this scheme is striking.  We commit ourselves to the 
contract on terms that in effect instruct others to inflict on us for breaches of the law 
the penalties we stand ready to inflict on others.  Not to punish criminals would be a 
dereliction of moral duty, and Kant observes in a footnote that a society that knew it 
would perish from the earth in the middle of the night should ensure that the 
murderers in its jails were hanged before the society was destroyed.12  Even in Texas, 
this might be thought a bit fierce, but the grounds for Kant’s views are not as odd as 
the conclusions they ground.  To be part of a law-abiding society is to be part of a 
scheme of rights-observance; in effect, we are estopped from complaining that others 
hold us to standards of rights-observance that we have advertised ourselves as 
accepting.  We do not become outlaws by violating the rights of others, tempting 
though it is to say that we forfeit our immunity to the assaults of others if we break 
the rules that protect them against the assault of ourselves.  What we forfeit is only 
our immunity to whatever punishment is properly imposed by the agents of the 
criminal justice system.  We become criminals, not outlaws, which is to say that we 
are still within the ambit of law, and are treated as beings with rights, not beings 
without them.   
                                                                
12IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (J.H. Bernard trans., 1968). 
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This is plainly correct, and it makes sense of some of the things that distress 
critics of capital punishment, such as the suicide watch that is kept on condemned 
criminals.  If the only thing we were interested in was that condemned criminals 
should be dead, we’d presumably not mind how they became dead―and quite a lot 
of hard-boiled commentators have suggested that leaving a bottle of something lethal 
readily to hand would be a cheap way of disposing of the condemned who chose to 
go of their own volition.  It would, however, be a lawless way of proceeding, and for 
those who care that punishment should be a lawful undertaking this is intolerable, 
however perverse the results appear.  But this is running ahead of things, because the 
more crucial question is how people actually get on to death row in the first place.  
Here,  issues of rights-violation really rear their heads.   
The first thought is that if capital punishment is felt to be special, as it plainly is 
in western societies nowadays, then all the usual rules have to be observed with 
extreme scrupulousness.  What are they? Begin at the beginning; we all have a right 
not to be condemned for any crime that we have not committed, even if this is barely 
over-staying at a parking meter.  How fastidiously this right has to be observed 
before there is a serious injustice is another matter, however; to complain that my 
rights were seriously violated by a parking authority that did not maintain its parking 
meters in tip-top condition would be going a bit far.  To complain that my rights 
were seriously violated by a state that hired known drunks to defend me in a capital 
case would be putting the matter quite lightly.  This point runs right through the 
whole of criminal justice, and I want to say two things that may seem surprising.  
The first is that capital cases are not to my mind as special as the public inclines to 
think, and the second is that the issues raised by capital cases run disquietingly 
through the whole criminal justice system.  Let us start with the banal thought that 
we have a right to be tried on one issue only, namely whether we did or did not 
commit the crime of which we stand accused.  There is no law against being black, 
against having a low IQ, or against being poor.  It is, however, inconceivable that 
any well-off white person of reasonable intelligence would run much risk (not, that is 
to say no risk at all, but very much less than a poor, not very bright black person of 
comparable wickedness) of suffering the death penalty in the United States.  Nor is 
this primarily a racial matter; as the case of OJ Simpson sufficiently illustrates, 
anyone with really substantial means need not worry unduly that they will suffer 
execution if they put their minds to escaping it.  I ought to say that this is not a 
uniquely American phenomenon, nor one relevant only to the death penalty.  The 
prisons of Britain contain disproportionately many young black men, and the 
criminal classes are overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of the poor and the 
educationally subnormal.  But these are banal observations, so why are they worth 
noticing? 
If the justice of punishment depends on its being part of a general scheme of 
social control under which we all observe the law in order to share in the benefits of 
general law-abidingness, there must be some rough equity in how we are requited for 
our forbearance.  Contrary to some radical views, the poor, the intellectually 
unadvantaged, and members of low-status groups certainly get something from the 
legal system, and in some ways they get more than is apparent.  If the law is 
scrupulously observed, they are protected from exploitation, and especially from 
being bamboozled by the quick and the clever, as well as from being subject to 
arbitrary ill-treatment at the hands of the majority.  They may have little property to 
protect, few contracts to enforce, and meager estates to bequeath, but they have their 
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lives, limbs and security to ensure, as much as anyone else.  Nonetheless, they are, as 
Bentham observed, required to keep their hands off the property of the rich, they are 
obliged not to take shortcuts to obtain the property of others, and they ought to be 
adequately recompensed for this abstention.  One form that that recompense might 
properly take is being guaranteed the real as distinct from the nominal protection of 
the law.  So far as the law of property goes, individuals who have little property must 
have what they do possess fastidiously protected, and the widow’s cottage be as safe 
from harm as the plutocrat’s mansion.  The life and times of Rockefeller, Astor and 
Frick suggest that we do not always live up to that.  When it comes to the criminal 
law, the thought is even starker.  Your life and liberty must not be at stake because 
your means are slender.  So, one right we must have in place before the death penalty 
can be imposed without a violation of rights is a genuine right to free and equal 
justice, and that must mean that the quality of legal assistance available to the badly 
off must be no worse than that available to the well off.   
But, aside from the utopian quality of that aspiration, does it pick out the needs of 
defendants in capital cases only? This is where things gets more complicated.  It is 
generally assumed that capital cases are special, but I want to raise some doubts 
about that.  You may think that this is British callousness, and that only in a country 
where they used to execute fourteen year olds for sheep-stealing, and where the theft 
of five shillings was capital - and indeed, where the families of those condemned to 
hang used to pay the hangman a few pence to be allowed to pull on the feet of their 
relatives to ensure a quicker and more merciful death―could anyone doubt that 
capital cases are special.  Now I don’t deny that the death penalty has become 
special, inasmuch as those who are eager to see it imposed have gone to enormous 
and expensive lengths to ensure that it can be―it being on average three times dearer 
to kill a criminal than keep him in jail for thirty odd years - and the intricacies of 
what the Supreme Court does and doesn’t permit have become pretty extraordinary.  
But this is what you might call factitious specialness; it results from people thinking 
that the death penalty is special, and it provides no independent reason to think that it 
is.  The most obvious difference between death and all other penalties is that the 
death penalty has a finality that no other punishment has.  Even this, however, ought 
not to be exaggerated.  When inmates of Angola go in on a life sentence without 
parole, they stay in Angola until they die, as much as if they were going in only until 
they are executed; as much as those who are executed, they will leave only in a 
coffin.  Nor is the death penalty final in the sense of being passed and implemented 
speedily, so that the whole thing is over and done with at once.  We cannot today 
draw the same sharp distinction as we can between the finality of the old English 
system, where there was no appeal, and if the judge did not exercise mercy you were 
hanged at the conclusion of the assizes, and ‘Angola finality’ extending over forty 
years.  The average stay on death row is almost two decades, so what those who are 
executed in fact receive is a life sentence followed by a lethal injection.  Perhaps the 
finality we care about most is symbolic: the sentence expresses our conviction that 
you cannot be rehabilitated, that we have finally given up on you.  Or perhaps it’s 
merely precautionary: the only thing we are interested in is making sure you don’t do 
whatever it was again, and this is an effective way of achieving that.   
The thought that this is the sort of finality that many people want is supported by 
the fact that supporters of the death penalty moderate their support if offered the 
alternative of life without parole.  There surely are some people whom we just want 
out of the way; but death on the one hand and throwing away the key on the other are 
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not very different ways of achieving that.  The sort of finality that disturbs critics, on 
the other hand, reflects the fact that death is irreparable, and that it is too late to 
change our minds about guilt or about the justice of a sentence once we have killed 
the person sentenced to die.  That’s both irrefutable and important, but it also 
suggests some of the reasons that lead me to say that all punishment can raise similar 
issues.  Consider Ian Gordon, acquitted in October at the age of seventy of a murder 
he almost certainly did not commit fifty two years ago.  He has an IQ in the 80s, and 
when he was eighteen was shy, hesitant, eager to please, and just the sort of person 
who will confess to a crime he didn’t commit in order to be helpful.  You cannot 
exactly give him back his life.  Nor can we do very much for another not very bright 
middle-aged man who has been in jail for twenty-seven years because he will not 
admit to having committed the murder for which he was sentenced at the age of 
seventeen.  Since he seems not to have committed it, one can hardly blame him for 
saying so, but no parole board will release him until he ‘comes to terms’ with his 
crime.  It is not clear that their plight is very much less than that of the person who 
has been executed, and it is not clear that the finality with which their ordinary lives 
were terminated was very much less than the finality of death.  We think, intuitively, 
that killing people is very much more dramatic than locking them up, and I don’t 
want to deny that it is.  But I do want to say that we now think so for reasons that 
have more to do with our attitudes towards the death penalty and less to do with what 
we actually inflict on the criminal who is punished. 
Let us leave finality, and rest on this: although there is nothing about the death 
penalty that means, intrinsically, that we may not inflict it, and that the victim of it 
has a right not to have it imposed on him or her under any circumstances, there are a 
set of  rights to just treatment under a system of criminal law that constrain what can 
justly be done to anyone.  We all have a right to be subject only to a fair system of 
investigation, arrest, interrogation, and prosecution.  This might perhaps cover a 
limited amount of so-called racial profiling, in the sense that it is not unfair―if it is 
done scrupulously and sensitively―to keep a particular eye on people who are more 
likely than the rest of the population to have committed some crime or other.  Known 
homophobes cannot complain, on this view, if an obviously homophobically 
motivated crime is followed by some scrutiny of their actions, just as the discovery 
of a road death victim with a great smear of white paint on their clothes rightly sends 
the police looking for white cars and panel vans.  It does not license a priori 
assumptions about the likelihood that any given murder was committed by a member 
of some racial or income group.  A person who can reasonably claim that the police 
set out to stitch him up, or that they did not question their own assumptions about 
who was guilty of the crime, can reasonably claim that their rights have been 
violated.  (Of course, they may be guilty none the less.) This applies to all crimes and 
all penalties, and only to the extent that the death penalty is special, applies with 
special force to capital cases. 
The process of chasing, catching, interrogating and processing for prosecution is 
one part of the story.  Since some people are unusually vulnerable to ill-treatment 
and unusually inept in self-defense in this stage, the foregoing arguments apply more 
sharply to them, which is why I made some tart remarks about the educationally 
subnormal.  As for the trial itself, I have already said that the same considerations 
apply with even more force.  If we are to jail people, let along hang them, we must 
be sure that all that can be said on their side has been said.  This entails defense 
lawyers no less competent and no less well provided for than the lawyers for the 
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prosecution.  I perhaps ought to say that I do not think of a good lawyer in quite the 
way that many Americans do in this context.  I do not think that the adversarial 
theory of justice means that the task of a defense lawyer is to get his client acquitted 
no matter his guilt or innocence.  Lawyers are agents of the system of justice as 
much or more as agents of their clients.  They are officers of the court as well as 
hired help for the dubiously well-behaved.  It is easy to confuse two distinct 
thoughts, the first that the best way of ensuring justice is to operate an adversarial 
system of justice so that each side can properly scrutinize the other side’s case, the 
other that justice is whatever results from having two sides fight it out as best they 
can.  The second is not true; a criminal trial is not a boxing match―in the latter, the 
object is to batter your opponent into a condition where he cannot continue to fight, 
but in the former the object is to discover an objectively true answer to a part-factual, 
part-legal question: did the accused commit the crime of which he is accused? Just as 
the finding of this answer is frustrated if the defense lawyers see it as their job to trip 
up the prosecution by any means possible, and to get the jury on their side by any 
degree of grandstanding, misrepresentation, and whatever lies or near-lies that the 
judge will let them get away with, so it is frustrated―and much more frequently - if 
the accused has poor representation.  It is in this sense that my own answer to the 
question whether the hundred and forty people executed in Texas under the auspices 
of Governor Bush have had their rights violated, would be yes.  They may or may 
not for the most part be guilty, and perhaps even be guilty as charged of the crimes 
for which they were sentenced, but they have not had an adequate defense, they were 
not pursued, arrested, interrogated and prosecuted under a squeakily clean system.  It 
is not their being put to death, but their being put to death as part of that process, 
that is the violation of rights, and the rights that have been violated would have 
equally been violated if they had been jailed for twenty years instead.   
Now, one response to this sort of argument―and one that I am more sympathetic 
to than you might suppose―is that no system of criminal justice can be squeaky 
clean in the sense I am demanding.  Hard-bitten cops and criminal lawyers 
sometimes observe that it is warfare out on the mean streets, and that a fastidious 
concern for justice on the battlefield is likely to get you killed.  Let us take the 
analogy seriously.  Those who make war on civilized society cannot complain of 
injustice if society makes war on them.  But that thought is covered by the right of 
self-defense and immediate retaliation.  Persons who adopt a posture of incipient 
aggression cannot complain if they are taken seriously, and a coke-head with a toy 
gun who has the bad luck to wave it at an armed shopkeeper suffers bad luck but no 
injustice if he is shot.  But even in warfare there are rights in plenty to be considered.  
The first is that non-combatants have the right to be immune from aggression; too 
casual an attitude to the victims caught in the crossfire, and too casual a view of what 
evidence we need before we decide that someone is an incipient enemy, removes the 
case from lawful self-defense and turns it into wanton aggression.  And there are 
further arguments behind that one.  One is that we should not accept the hard-bitten 
view too swiftly.  Far from turning ordinary criminal justice into domestic warfare, 
the task of civilized states has always been that of trying to make real warfare more 
like domestic criminal justice.  We try―and we do not wholly fail―to conduct war 
as a measured exercise in deterrence and retribution rather than an all out exercise in 
slaughter and incapacitation; the notion lying behind the attempt to do so is in part 
that we want enemy societies to rejoin the society of nations in due course.  If that is 
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an ideal, then too much dwelling on the idea of the control of crime as a sort of 
domestic warfare is unhelpful. 
In short, I end where I started.  There are no grounds for saying that the death 
penalty is always and everywhere a violation of rights.  Few people think, to take a 
concrete instance, that Eichman’s rights were violated when Israel hanged him, even 
if they think that Israel might have done better to hold the trial and then let him go, 
or at any rate to have found him guilty and not hanged him.  A death penalty 
imposed for those crimes, if any, for which it was uniquely effective as a deterrent, 
and to which it was not disportionate as a penalty, would not violate the criminal’s 
rights, so long as the criminal had been arrested, tried, and convicted according to the 
strictest rules of justice, and so long as the criminal was of sound mind and fully 
responsible for their actions.  This, in effect, is to say that I agree with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Furman v Georgia13 in 1972, but that I would take rather more 
persuading than the Supreme Court has lately taken that the appropriate degree of 
fastidiousness has been maintained.  My guess is that no society that persistently 
thought as the majority in Furman14 thought would in fact impose the death penalty, 
but it might, and especially in time of war.  If it did not, I suspect it would be 
because any society that thought in that way would mind about things in addition to 
rights—such as compassion and forgiveness and reconciliation and rehabilitation—
and would simply not wish to employ capital punishment.  But there are many things 
we have the right to do that we do not do, and that we think ourselves right not to do.   
Which brings me to a last, entirely informal coda on the question of the death 
penalty in its own right.  I have said that all punishment works by depriving people 
of things they value, whether money, liberty, or life itself; that we employ the threat 
of such deprivation as a deterrent to law-breaking; and that what we may threaten is 
restricted by a constraint of retributive appropriateness such that the harm we inflict 
on the wrongdoer must not be disproportionate to the harm he or she inflicts.  These 
principles allow the defender of the death penalty to claim that death is a proper 
harm to threaten for crimes of a sufficient degree of gravity―murder in our society, 
but blasphemy in others, corruption in others, and drug-dealing in many.  My 
purpose has been to argue that it is all the things that may go wrong between the 
commission of a crime and the execution of the offender that should concern us.  But 
I now turn briefly to some speculation on why the death penalty is felt by so many 
people in the United States to be peculiarly appropriate.  Notice the limitation of time 
and place; in societies where incarceration was difficult and expensive, physical 
penalties such as beating, mutilation, and execution have an obvious utilitarian 
justification they do not have for us.   
In the American context, a trawl of pro-death penalty internet sites, some of 
which are of considerable sophistication and display an impressive grasp of the 
empirical literature, suggests that above all they are animated by the conviction that 
it is a divine commandment to kill murderers.  The role of religion in the debate is 
thus interestingly confused.  Thirty nine Christian churches have made formal and 
official declarations against the death penalty, including churches not otherwise 
noted for their cultural liberalism such as the Southern Baptists; but there seems to 
exist among the population at large a fundamentalist and literalist determination to 
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take the words of the Old Testament at face value, and to repudiate the attempts of 
church leaders to invoke Christ’s gospel of forgiveness in condemning the death 
penalty.   
This is not to deny any of the obvious empirical evidence that opinion alters 
when the death penalty is compared to other punishments such as life imprisonment 
without parole, that enthusiasm for the death penalty drops when it is explained that 
it is not cheap, or that it is not particularly effective as a deterrent.  One may be 
motivated by a religiously based morality but still pull back from its implications if 
they are at odds with other values, or with common sense.  Still, we need some 
explanation of the fact that some Americans, and particularly Americans in some 
parts of the United States, are attached to the death penalty for reasons that evidently 
do not move their fellow-countrymen in Michigan or New Jersey.  Supporters of the 
death penalty who concede that it is too expensive a form of punishment concede the 
point; they do not welcome it.  This is different from the twenty percent of the 
sampled population who shift from supporting the death penalty to opposing it when 
they are asked to compare it with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  
They plainly hold a ‘throw away the key’ view of the matter, and if assured that the 
key can be thrown away more cheaply without killing people, they take the 
alternative.  The rest think death is what counts. 
Together with the anecdotal evidence of the websites, this suggests that the 
familiar finding that the United States is the outlier among developed countries in 
being more or less immune to secularization has implications in penology too.  It 
may also be related to a feature that the United States shares with Britain.  In both 
countries, criminals are more inclined towards a strongly retributive and generally 
rather violent view of punishment.  Felons support the death penalty more strongly 
than the population at large; this leads some advocates of the death penalty to 
suggest that this is ‘horse’s mouth’ support for the deterrent effect of the penalty and 
opponents to suggest that it confirms that human beings are poor judges of their own 
motivation.  At all events, what we might conclude is that simple, firmly structured, 
world-views facilitate the thought that death is the apt and appropriate penalty for 
murder in particular.  One might observe in passing that the Old Testament catalogue 
of death penalty offences, though shorter than the list of 222 that the British penal 
code ran to in the 18th century, is a great deal longer than that of the modern 
supporters.  Bestiality and adultery are not offered up as candidates for stoning and 
incineration.15  Nor is blasphemy.   
But this raises the question of what it is about the culture that sustains this 
selective but energetic espousal of a religiously based approach to punishment.  One 
possibility is that it reflects a form of cultural pessimism.  This is not to say that it is 
pessimistic about economic growth, or about the possibility of making large fortunes, 
or a good deal else.  What then, might it be pessimistic about?  Perhaps about the 
innate sinfulness of mankind, about the immovability of the stain of evil that wicked 
actions place upon us.  It is hard to give a clear account, because the cultural view 
itself so colors the things we are describing; but the thought I have in mind is this.  A 
wholly secular view tends to be forward-looking and not entirely judgmental: given 
that a criminal committed crime X, what are the odds that they’ll do it again, what is 
the risk that letting this one out will weaken the deterrent effect of the penalty, and so 
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endlessly on.  The non-secular view is that the person had stained their soul, and 
might seek divine mercy but could not look forward to divine justice with any 
optimism.  When I say the cultural view colors the phenomenon, I mean that the 
secular mind tends to see the past as in some sense eradicable and forgettable, the 
religious mind not so.  If people have incurred the stain that merits death―not that 
death erases it―then death it is.  You might agree that people have become changed 
characters since their crimes, and much else besides, but you would harden your 
heart in the interests of preserving the rigid connection between the crime and the 
penalty. 
As to why we must kill criminals, the best account was given by a two-thirds mad 
aristocrat and emigré some years after the French Revolution.  In his St Petersburg 
Dialogues, Joseph de Maistre gives a particularly disgusting account of a public 
execution, in which he imagines a man being broken on the wheel―that is to say, 
being stretched out across a cartwheel and being killed by having all his limbs 
systematically smashed by the executioner.  The scene ends with the executioner 
walking through the crowd, which draws aside at his passing; ‘justice drops a few 
coins into his hand, from a distance,’ says de Maistre.  Then he goes on to argue that 
honor, glory, and civilization itself rest on ‘this incomprehensible agent.’  It is 
precisely the fact that killing people is so strictly forbidden that makes it the thing to 
do when we wish to make a point; the man who does the killing would be a murderer 
or a butcher if he were not the agent of the state.  It is this that means we cannot quite 
approve of the executioner, no matter how skilled he may be.  It also means that we - 
collectively, that is to say―cannot quite make up our minds about the way we want 
death inflicted.  If it is to be an exemplary spectacle, it should be public, and the 
degree of brutality involved is not especially important.  There is a degree of cruelty 
beyond which the motives of the state might be impugned, so limits must be 
observed; but making it easy for the criminal is not the object of the exercise―if it 
were, he might be given poison unawares.  (Nebraska did try in the 1920s to 
asphyxiate the condemned by pumping gas into their cells while they slept; it didn’t 
work.)  If it is not to be an exemplary spectacle, the temptation is to medicalise the 
whole business, as if it is a form of euthanasia―as when people executed by lethal 
injection have their arm swabbed with antiseptic before the fatal needle is inserted.  
That defeats several of the objects of the exercise, but I would not suggest that the 
choice before us is to embrace public and exemplary hanging on the one side or to 
give up on the death penalty entirely on the other.  The social costs associated with 
public execution are just one further topic that has been left unexplored in this 
already over-extended essay. 
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